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IN THE SUPRE;ME COURT 
of the 
ST.ATE OF UTAH 
KARNA HELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appelant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY -STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8513 
All Italics are ours throughout this brief. The Plain-
tiff and Respondent will be referred to as plaintiff. De-
fendant and Appellant will be referred to as defendent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the stat,ement of facts contained 
in the brief of the Appellant as far as it recites the pro-
cedural matters which have occurred before the trial court. 
However, there are many important details of t,he Master 
Agreement and of the Arbitrator's opinion which were 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. ,' '~ 2 . 
not discussed in the statement of facts and which Respon-
dent believes should be contained in a statement of facts. 
The collective bargaining agreement appears at 
pages 44-48 of the record. It is a typical collective bar-
gaining agreement with many of the objects and articles 
which are commonly found in such agreement. 
One of the most important portions of the agreement 
is contained in Article I. There the agreement states 
that: 
"The objects of this agreement, and the aims 
and intentions which the parties are desirous of 
attaining are: 
(a) To effectuate a spirit of fair dealing be-
tween employer and employee. 
(b) To bring about and establish a high order 
of discipline and efficiency by tl1e intelligent co-
operation of employer and employee. 
(c) To provide for adjustment of all matters 
subject to arbitration by procedure hereinafter set 
forth." 
Article II of the agreement contains a no strike clause,: 
Article III contains a provision that the company will 
not suspend, discipline, discharge or discriminate against 
any employee for lawful union activities. Article IV des-
cribes the employees and the portions of the employers 
business which shall be governed by the collective bar-
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gaining agreement. Article V provides for union recogni-
tion, Article VI provides for union security and grants 
what is in effect a union shop provision. Article VII pro-
vides for check-off of union dues and Article VIII pro-
vides for seniority. It reads as follows: 
"The Company agrees in lay-offs and rehiring 
of employees to observe the principle of depart-
mental seniority wherever reasonable in the light 
of efficiency. The Company, however, to be the 
judge of qualifications in such matters. In apply-
ing seniority, the employer shall take into con-
sideration length of service, merit and ability of 
t,he employee." 
Article X provides for arbitration and reads as follows: 
"All controversies as to the interpretation and 
application of this master agreement that cannot 
be settled by the representative of the employer 
and the Union, within the period of one week from 
the date that the grievance is called to the atten-
tion of the other party in writing, shall submit 
the matter for decision to a Board of Arbitration 
to be constituted as hereinafter set forth:" 
Article XI grants to the union a right to access to 
the plant for the purpose of investigating any grievances 
which may arise. Article XII provides for a shop steward 
on the upstairs division and the downstair division and 
the two shop stewards and the president of the Union 
constitute a grievance committee. Article XIII provides 
for leave of absence for personal reasons. Article XIV 
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provides for uniforms and places the obligation of furnish-
ing them upon the employer. Article XV grants to the 
female employees of the Union leave of absence in case 
of maternity and provides such leaves shall be granted 
without loss of seniority. Article XVI, entitled "Termi-
nation," provides for the ways in which the Master Agree-
ment shall be terminated or shall come to a natural end. 
The Master Agreement was in effect at all times 
during the employment of plaintiff. She was the presi-
dent of the Local Union. As president she was a member 
of the grievance committee. 
Plaintiff was discharged on December 2, 1954. There 
was assigned as a cause for her discharge "insubordination 
and uncooperativeness." The discharge and surrounding 
circumstances were made the subject of a complaint by 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union 562. 
Pursuant to the agreement the matter was submitted to 
the Honorable William H. Leary as sole arbitrator. How-
ever, the parties were not able to agree upon the matter 
to be arbitrated and Mr. Leary was required to frame 
issues for submission to him for arbitration. 
The decision of the arbitrator was submitted to the 
trial court and was considered by him in reaching his 
decision and making the memorandum opinion. It is 
found on pages 49-55 of the record. 
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The arbitrator's decision contains a recital of the 
occurrences prior to the submission of the rna tter for 
arbitration. 
The issue in dispute is set forth as follows ( R. 50) : 
"Was the discharge of Karna Held on December 
2nd, 1954, by the Company in violation of Article 
III of the contract between the parties?" 
It was the position of the Union that plaintiff had 
been discharged because of her union activities as a mem-
ber of the grievance committee and as president of the 
Local. 
The company's position was that she was discharged 
for insubordination and uncooperativeness, with regard 
to her duties as one of the shop stewards. 
The Arbitrator made his findings of fact and as a 
part of the findings he found that plaintiff, during the 
time that she was president of the local union and on 
the grievance committee had presented a number of 
grievances on behalf of the individual employees. A por-
tion of the grievances which she discussed with the em-
ployer were the discharges of Ida Gertz and Darlene 
Fowler. 
The discharge of plaintiff occurred after she had 
presented a grievance concerning overalls which were 
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assigned to some of the girls whose normal work involved 
only the pressing of gowns. 
The decision of the Arbitrator indicates that plaintiff 
had been in the employ of defendant for five years eight 
months, <R 50), that she was one of the most efficient 
operators in the room and the company had no com-
plaints with her works, <R 52). 
The conclusions of the Arbitrator were that the dis-
pute between the company and plaintiff was one which 
was covered by the Master Agreement and over which 
the Arbitrator had jurisdiction. But the issue was re-
stricted to the question, of whether or not plaintiff was 
discharged for lawful union activity, <R 53). 
Mr. Leary states in his conclusions the following, 
<R 53): 
"The decisions of the present arbitrator should 
not in any way be construed as foreclosing or 
prejudicing her rights to proceed in a court of law 
against the company for discharge without 'just 
' " cause . 
At another point in his conclusions, the Arbitrator 
states as follows, <R 54): 
"The weight of the evidence substantiated the 
Company's contention that Mrs. Held ,vas dis-
charged for alleged insubordination and uncooper-
ativeness. Whether or not the Company did, or 
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can, substantiate such justifications is another 
matter not involved in t,his dispute." 
The decision of the Arbitrator then reads as follows: 
"The Arbitrator Decides: 
1. That the objection of Counsel for the 
Company that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction 
to decide the present dispute concerning the dis-
charge of Karna Held, because the contract be-
tween the parties has no provision relating to dis-
charges, is overruled. 
2. The discharge of Karna Held on Decem-
ber 2, 1954, by the Company was not in violation 
of Article III of the contract between the parties." 
After the decision of the Arbitrator plaintiff com-
menced her action against the defendant and alleged 
that she had been wrongfully discharged and that the 
defendant terminated her employment without "just 
cause" and contrary to the contract of employment which 
Is entitled "Master Agreement". 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the 
trial court asked for the submission of briefs. The briefs 
were submitted and the matter re-argued. 
It was determined that under the t,erms of the Master 
Agreement and the interpretation that had been given 
to it by the arbitrator defendant, plaintiff and the Union, 
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plaintiff's right under the contract, was for continuing 
employment which could not be terminated without 
"just cause". 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN LINEN 
SUl~PLY CO. AND A'MALGAJM~TED CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL 
UNION 562 GRANTS TO THE WORKERS OF AMERICAN LINEN 
SUPPLY COMPANY A RIGHT TO CONTINUING EMPLOYMENT 
WHICH CAN ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE. 
POINT II. 
THE ARBITRATOR'S OPINION INTERPRETED AND APPLIED TilE 
MA!STER AGREEMENT AND IS BINDING UPON BOTH PARTIES TO 
THIS ACTION, IT DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A CON-
TINUING RI1GHT OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINABLE ONLY FOR JUST 
CAUSE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN UNEN 
SUPPLY CO. AND AMALGM1ATED CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL 
UNION 562 GRANTS TO THE WORKERS OF AMERICAN LINEN 
SUPPLY COMPANY A RIGHT TO CONTINUIN·G EMPLOYMENT 
WHICH CAN ONLY BE TBRMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE. 
A careful examination of the Master Agreement will 
reveal that the American Linen Supply Co. and the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union 562 agreed 
that the employees of American Linen Supply Co. would 
be granted a right to continuing employment, that this 
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right to continuing employment would not be son1ething 
which could be arbitrarily and capriciously terminated 
by unilateral action of the employer. 
If the position of defendant is correct the collective 
bargaining agreement has no substance whatsoever. It 
is an illusory agreement. Any time defendant desires to 
cease to be governed by the provisions of the Master Agree-
ment it could arbit~rarily and capriciously terminate the 
employment of all members of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers Local Union 562. If it had a right to discharge 
which it could exercise arbitrarily whenever one of its 
employees was obtaining that degree of seniority which 
gave to the employee a right to certain types of preferred 
employment, the employment of such an employee could 
be terminated. The same would be true as to the mater-
nity rights which are granted to the employees. When-
ever an employee sought maternit~y leave her employ-
ment could be terminated and no grounds would need be 
recited for the termination. 
It is submitted that an interpretation which defen-
dant seeks would reduce the Master Agreement to anul-
lity and is therefore one which is absurd and cannot, 
as a consequence, be the interpretation which was in-
tended by the parties to the agreement. 
If the defendant has the right to arbitrarily and 
capriciously discharge its employees who are members 
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of the local union, that would not promote the objects 
which are set forth in Article I. A right to arbitrarily 
and capriciously discharge, is not a right which would 
effectuate a spirit of fair dealing between the employer 
and the employee. 
A right to arbitrarily and capriciously discharge 
employees would not bring about and establish a high 
order of discipline and efficiency by the intelligent co-
operation of employee and employer. It would defeat the 
second objective set forth in Article I of the agreement. 
Certainly a right to arbitrarily and capriciously dis-
charge employees would defeat the objects of sub-para-
graph (c) which provides for adjustments of all matters 
by arbitration. 
On this particular matter 've need not remain in 
doubt further than to examine the Arbitrator's decision, 
for the Arbitrator has determined that the matter of the 
discharge of an individual employee 'vas a fit subject for 
arbitration under the terms of the agreement. Both 
parties, now before this court, are bound by the Arbi-
trator's opinion. Within the four corners of the Arbi-
trator's decision, plaintiff respectifully submits there is 
a further finding, that under the terms of the Master 
Agreement, plaintiff cannot be discharged 'vithout "just 
" cause . 
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The basic contention of defendant is that because 
there is no specific provision in the Master Agreement, 
which categorically states that the company shall not 
discharge without "just cause", none can be inferred. Such 
a provision in collective bargaining agreements is not a 
usual thing. A number of such agreements have been ex-
amined by boards of arbitration as well as by this court 
and there was no specific provision against discharge . 
without cause. 
In Russell v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Com-
pany, ________________ u ________________ 247 P.2d, 257, this court had 
before it an example of a collective bargaining agreement 
which did not specifically provide that the individual 
employee could not be discharged without cause. Within 
the four corners of the agreement, however, there was 
provisions for a hearing on grounds cited for discharges. 
It was determined by the court that an employee had 
a right to continuing employment and could not be dis-
charged without just cause. 
It would appear that both parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements have assumed that the employer was 
not claiming or attempting to reserve his right to arbi-
trarily and capriciously discharge an employee. As a 
consequence, the most obvious of the provisions was not 
placed in the agreement. Such was the situation in the 
Russell case. 
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The right of an employee where a collective bargain-
ing agreement which does not, by its terms, specifically 
set out and provide that the employee shall not be dis-
charged without good and sufficient cause, has been before 
a number of Boards of Arbitration. One of the most en-
lightening of such decisions is: In re The Atwater Manu-
facturing Company, United Steel Workers of America. 
Local 3456, C./.0., Case No. 133-4950-150, December 
7, 1949, 13 L.A. 747 decided by the Connecticut State 
Board of Mediation and Arbitration composed of Joseph 
F. Donnelly, Mitchell Sviridoff and W. Stuart Clark. 
The company, in the Atwater case took the position; 
( 1) that the collective bargaining agreement by its terms 
provided that only disputes as to the meaning and ap-
plication of the terms of the agreement are arbitrable; 
(2) no agreement is arbitrable unless it is processed in 
accord with the grievance procedure. Under position 
( 1 ) , the basic question 'vas whether or not a discharge 
of employees was an arbitrable dispute or grievance. The 
employer contended that it was not and the union con-
tended that it was. 
The company claimed that discharges are not ar-
bitrable since the agreement provides only for the arbi-
tration of disputes as to the meaning and application of 
the agreement and the agreement has no clause covering 
discharge. The union claimed, as does plaintiff, that if 
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the employer has the right to arbitrarily discharge his 
employees, many of the most, important provisions of the 
agreement have little meaning. The Board of Arbitration 
accepted the union's position and stated that no sound 
argument could be made against it because if the com-
pany by a unilateral decision may discharge without re-
striction or protest the company could also violate many 
of the provisions of the agreement without restriction or 
protest by simply discharging this or that employee. As 
a result the seniority clause would not have any meaning 
whatsoever and there would be no restriction of any 
effect as to lay-offs. The company, by simply discharging 
this employee or that employee when it chooses and with-
out regard to cause, could discharge those employees 
with the highest seniority rating and in effect completely 
disregard the seniority provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Board of Arbitration stated its 
position in the following language: 
"If the Company can discharge without cause, 
it can lay off without cause. It can recall, transfer, 
or promote in violation of the seniority provisions 
simply by invoking its claimed right to discharge. 
Thus to interpret the agreement in accord with 
the claim of the Company would reduce to anul-
lity the fundamental provisions of a labor-manage-
ment agreement- the security of a worker in his 
job." 
The defendant,, in the present case, argues that there 
is nothing in the written collective bargaining agreement 
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which specifically covers the company's right to discharge 
or any restrictions on that right. The same thing was 
true in the Atwater case and the Board of Arbitrators in 
discussing and disposing of such contentions stated as 
follows (p.749, 750): 
"In view of the above, it is difficult to accept 
the company's claim that since the agreement 
contains no expressed limitation of managements 
discretion in the rna tter of discharges, its action is 
not reviewable under the grievance procedure. 
Such a provision either explicit or implicit is sel-
dom found in the collective bargaining agreement 
today. 
"The fact is that the agreement does not, in 
specific language, confer on management the right 
to discharge at will, nor does it, by specific lan-
guage confer upon the union the· right to process 
discharges under the grievance procedure. Hence, 
the dispute here is not one as to the application of 
specific terms of the agreement but rather a dis-
pute as to the meaning of the provisions in the 
agreement and as such by mutual agreement of 
the parties properly, it is within the jurisdiction 
of the Board. This point deserves further dis-
cussion." 
The Board then discussed the nature of collective 
bargaining agreements and the restrictions that such an 
agreement placed both on the employees' rights and on 
the employer's rights and then as its conclusion, it stated 
as follows: 
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"In the instant case, the Company claims an 
unlimited right to discharge. The basis of its 
claims is that the agreement does not state that 
the company does not have this right. The fact 
is, however, that in the agreement both the com-
pany and union have agreed on definite employee 
rights, which rights would be meaningless if they 
did not necessarily imply a severe modification of 
the company's right to discharge. We must con-
sider the agreement to be logical and consistent and 
we must conclude that the parties deliberately 
worked for that logic and consistency in drawing 
the agreement. 
"Thus, the explicit terms of the agreement by 
establishing rights which are wholly inconsistent 
with the claims of the company must logically be 
considered to have modified any claimed rights 
which are not fairly expressed and which are in-
consistent with the explicit terms of the agreement. 
In the face of that conclusion, the claim of the 
company will not stand." 
The decision of the Board of Arbitrators then quoted 
extensively from a prior decision written by one Saul 
Wallen and a part of the portion of his decision quoted 
reads as follows (p.750): 
"In our opinion, the meaning of the con tract, 
(collective bargaining contract), w.hen viewed as 
a whole is that a limitation on the employer's 
right to discharge was created with the birth of 
the instrument. Both the necessity of maintaining 
the integrity of the contract's component parts 
and the very nature of collective bargaining agree-
ments are the basis for this conclusion. Inasmuch 
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as this limitation is an implied term of the con-
tract, discharges are subject to the grievance pro-
cedure and arbitration." 
The decision of the Board of Arbitration was that 
discharges are arbitrable grievances under the collective 
bargaining agreement even though they are not specifi-
cally mentioned by the agreement, and further that the 
contract which provides for seniority rights and worker's 
security implied provides that the employer shall not have 
an unrestricted, unlimited right to discharge without 
cause. 
An additional case on the question of a right of an 
employer to discharge without cause, employees who are 
under a collective bargaining agreement is In re Standard 
Oil Company & Central States Petroleum Union, West-
ern Michigan Petroleum Association, Local 103,- Case 
No. 50A-129, April 12, 1950, 14 L.A. 516. This decision 
was made by a three man Board of Arbitration under the 
laws of the State of Michigan. The Board of Arbitration 
had to consider the question of whether or not the com-
pany was within its right in discharging certain employees 
and whether or not the company is required to submit the 
question of their discharge to arbitration. As stated in 
the decision of the Board, the question was as follows: 
Whether or not where the current contract is entirely 
silent on the question of discharges, the company's right 
to relieve an e1nployee from its service with or without 
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cause rests exclusively with management and its action 
in respect thereto is challengable. 
The Board of Arbitration points out in the decision 
that the company had followed practice of not discharging 
its employees without good and sufficient cause. 
It will be noted that in the decision of the Arbitra-
tor, Mr. Leary recites the fact that the defendant assigned 
a cause for the discharge of plaintiff and on two other 
occasions, when discharges were made of employees, they 
were the subject of grievance procedures. Plaintiff her-
self, as president of the Union, had discussed with Ameri-
can Linen grievance officials the discharge of two em-
ployes, namely, Ida Gertz and Darlene Fowler, (R 51). 
Plaintiff submits that both the employees and the 
employer have followed a uniform course in the inter-
pretation of the Master Agreement. The employees have 
always claimed that they had a right to continuing em-
ployment which could not be terminated without just 
cause. The defendant, has recognized that claim because 
it has never attempted to discharge without cause. 
~~ An additional decision out of the State of Connecticut 
it and from the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration 
~~ is In re Whitney Chain Company, United Automobile 
~~~ Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Ameri-
~ ca, Local 199, C.I.O., Case No. 5354-705, March 16, 
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1955, 24 L.A. 385. There, the Board of Arbitration held 
that the company's right to discharge was a proper sub-
ject for arbitration. That the company did not have a 
right to discharge without cause, even though there was 
no specific term which prohibited the company from dis-
charging without cause. The decision was made in the 
face of a claim by the management that the right of dis-
charge was one vested exclusively in the management and 
therefore, not subject to arbitration. The Board decided 
that there must be proper cause shown by management 
before a discharge can be upheld. An additional decision 
from a Board of Arbitration is In re Pilot Freight Carriers, 
Inc., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, C.I.O. 391, 
A.F.L., No. 1, June 21, 1954, 22 L.A. 761. A three mem-
ber Board of Arbitration in Pennsvlvania rendered the 
following decision ( p. 7 61 ) : 
"Despite absence of contract clause requiring 
that discharges be for just cause, the employer 
may not discharge "~itl1out just cause, since one 
of the passive assumptions underlying every col-
lective bargaining agreement is that employer will 
not arbitrarily exercise his power to discharge." 
In addition to the clain1 that the tern1s of the Master 
Agreement did not give to plaintiff a right to any job 
security whatsoever nor any protection against arbitrary, 
capricious and \villful discharges, defendant clain1s that 
there is no right under the Master Agreement to arbi-
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trate or even consider controversies arising out of wrong-
ful discharges. Their positjon is that Article X, entitled 
"Arbitration", does not cover wrongful discharges. Ar-
ticle X states: 
"All controversies as to the interpretation and 
application of this Master Agreement that cannot be 
settled by a representative of the employer and the union," 
etc. shall be submitted to arbitrators. 
On very similar language it has been held that cause 
for discharge was a matter subject to arbitration. Lee 
Farris v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 32 L.A. 3547. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that an 
agreement which provided that the rights of discharged 
employees could not be arbitrated violates the National 
Labor Relations Act. The inclusion of such a provision 
in a contract is an unfair labor practice. Defendant now 
contends and asks this court to hold that an agreement 
which does not, by its specific terms, prohibit arbitx-ation 
on discharges does so by inference. See National Licorice 
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 
60 S.Ct. 569. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
National Licorice Co. case had before it a contract, which 
had been entered into by a union dominated by the em-
ployer. The employer by the terms of the contract, re-
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quired each employee to agree not to demand a closed 
shop or a signed agreement by his employer with any 
union. The agreement contained language which pro-
hibited collective bargaining or arbitration with respect 
to the discharge of employees. It provided that a discharg-
ed employee could submit to his employer a statement in-
dicating that h.is discharge was unreasonable. Then the 
agreement stipulated that the question as to the propriety 
of an employee discharge could in no event be one for 
arbitration or mediation (60 S.Ct 575). 
Justice Stone specifically stated that such a pro-
vision in a collective bargaining agreement was an unfair 
labor practice. A later circuit court case interpreting and 
applying the National Licorice Co. case is Inland Steel 
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board of United Steel 
Workers of America, C.I.O. et al, v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 170 F.2d 247. In clear and unequivocal 
language, the decision sets forth the background and 
philosophy behind the Supreme Court decision (p.252): 
"The Supreme Court, in National Licorice Co. 
V. N.L.R.B., 390 U.S. 350, 360~ 60 S.Ct. 569, 84 
L.Ed. 799, held that collective bargaining extends 
to matters involving discharge actions and, as 
already noted, the Company in its contract with 
the Union has so recognized. We are unable to 
differentiate between the conceded right of a 
Union to bargain concerning a discharge, and par-
ticularly a nondiscriminatory discharge of any em-
ployee and its right to bargain concerning the age 
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at which he is compelled to retire. In either case, 
the employee loses his job at the command of the 
employer; in either case, the effect upon the 'con-
ditions' of the person's employment is that the 
employment is terminated, and we L~ink, in either 
case, the affected employee is entitled under the 
Act to bargain collectively through his duly se-
lected representatives concerning such termina-
tion." 
The decision also contains language which is the 
very heart of the argument now presented by plaintiff 
to the court. In the decision, in discussing job security 
and whether or not such important rights are subjects 
which can be protected, the Seventh Circuit Court states 
as follows ( p .252) : 
"The Company also concedes that seniority is 
a proper matter for collective bargaining and, as 
already noted, has so recognized by its contract 
with the Union. It states in its brief that seniority 
is 'the very heart of conditions of employment.' 
Among the purposes which seniority serves is the 
protection of employees against arbitrary manage-
ment conduct in connection with hire, promotion, 
demotion, transfer and discharge, and the creation 
of job security for old workers. * * *" 
Even in plaintiff's case defendant did not claim an 
arbitrary, capricious right to discharge without cause. 
It set forth a cause and claimed that the cause of her dis-
charge was "Insubordination, Uncooperative to Super-
vision". 
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The three discharges of which we have evidence 
show a consistent, uninterrupted practice by defendant 
under this collective bargaining agreement. Discharges 
are not made without cause. Only when there exists just 
cause did defendant claim a right of discharge. The union 
and the employer have mediated, arbitrated, discussed 
and considered the claimed cause for discharge and have 
specifically resolved the difference as to whether or not 
the discharge was merited and whether or not the cause 
actually existed for such discharge in two of the three 
cases. 
Plaintiff considers the rights which she is claiming 
in this matter to be those of the greatest importance to the 
laboring man. Rights to job security from day to day 
as long as loyal and efficient services are rendered is the 
very foundation of all seniority rights. 
An employee who works for years at one job estab-
lishes a prior right to that job and builds for his pro-
tection seniority rights. These seniority rights are earned 
through the years of service tendered and received by the 
employer and if there is a right to arbitrarily, cap1iciously 
and without cause to discharge such an employee~ the 
whole field of seniority rights would be completely des-
troyed. 
If an employer can discharge without cause \Yhat 
good would years of loyal and faithful service do for an 
employee? At the capricious and arbitrarv \Yill of his 
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employer all his rights could be destroyed and he 
could be thrown back on the labor market without the 
benefit of a preferred place in industry and possibly at 
an age where further employment or new employment 
would be impossible to obtain. Certainly, the objects of 
the Master Agreement would not be sustained, promoted 
or in any way assisted if the court rules that under the 
Master Agreement the employer can arbitrarily and ca-
priciously discharge his employees. 
It is impossible for plaintjff to believe that the defen-
dant seriously claims that a right to arbitrarily and ca-
priciously discharge any employee without any cause is 
calculated "to effectuate a spirit of fair dealing between an 
employer and employee" or that such a right would 
"bring about and establish a high order of discipline and 
efficiency by the intelligent cooperation of employer and 
employee" or would it tend "to provide for adjustment 
of all matters subject to arbitration by the procedure here-
in set forth". Certainly, it would not "increase the stan-
dards of workmanship and conduct so as to insure fair 
and proper quantjty, quality and cost of production." 
Such a right would completely destroy rather than pro-
mote the standards of the linen supply industry in the 
City of Salt Lake and vicinity. It would destroy any res-
pect that the employee group as a whole would have 
for the industry and would in that way destroy the pat-
ronage and respect of the public for the industry. 
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What benefit can any employee receive from the 
clause prohibiting the discharge for lawful union activity 
if no cause is needed for discharge. The cases seem uni-
formly to recognize the principles that when an employer 
is called upon to show that an employee is discharged 
not for union activity only by coming forward with 
another cause, can the employer sustain his discharge? 
If the discharge is for no cause, that is if the discharge is 
not for some disciplinary purpose, then restoration of 
employment or damages is recognized by all the decisions. 
See Russell v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Ford, et al, 170 F.2d 
735. 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Superior Co., 
199 F.2d 39, the court stated the principle in the follow-
ing language: 
"It is conceded by the Board that the Act does 
not interfere with the normal exercise of the right 
of the employer to select its employees or to dis-
charge them for an}· reason except union activity 
or relationship. If a discharge is not arbitrarily 
made with a purpose. or as a11 excuse, to avoid 
the statute, it is not unla,vful. N.L.R.B. v. Jones 
& Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 45~ 57 S.Ct. 615~ 81 L.Ed. 
893; N.L.R.B. v. Tennessee Coach Co., 6 Cir., 
191 F.2d 546, 550. The employer's right to hire 
and fire includes the rigl1t to make reasonable rules 
and regulations and to discipline employees for 
violation thereof. N.L.R.B. v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 
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6 Cir., 166 F.2d 485, 491; N.L.R.B. v. Thompson 
Products, 6 Cir., 162 F.2d 287, 300. But the dis-
criminatory enforcement of a rule against an en1-
ployee engaged in union activities will cause a 
court to inquire carefully into the facts to deter-
mine whether the action taken against the em-
ployee was in reality because of his violation of 
the rule or because of his union activities. N.L.R.B. 
v. Ford, 6 Cir., 170 F.2d 735, 738-739. The Board 
contends in the present case that the real reason 
for the disciplinary action taken against the five 
members of the Union Committee was their union 
activities rather than their violation of the order 
prohibiting them from taking the day off to attend 
the conference at Dayton. If the refusal of the 
Respondent to grant the requested leave of absence 
was valid, disciplinary action which followed for 
a violation of the order was not improper. How-
ever if the refusal to grant the requested leave of 
absence was invalid under the Act, the disciplinary 
action which followed was likewise invalid.* * *" 
It is respectfully submitted that within the four 
corners of the Master Agreement the right is afforded 
to the plaintiff for job security and protection is given 
her against arbitrary and capricious discharges. That 
as a consequence she should have the right to have a jury 
determine, in a court of law, whether or not there has 
been any grounds for her discharge or whether or not 
it is arbitrary and capricious and without just cause. 
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POINT II. 
THE ~RBtiTRATOR'S OPINION INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE 
MASTER A:GR!BEMENT AND rs BINDIN'G U,PON BOTH PARTIES TO 
THIIS A!CTION, IT DETERMI1NED THAT PLAINTIFF_ HAD A CON-
TINU·ING RI,GHT OF EMPLOYlMENT TERMINABLE ONLY FOR JUST 
CAUSE. 
The Master Agreement is clear upon one part of 
the rules governing the action between plaintiff and de-
fendant. In Article X entitled "Arbitration" it states: 
"All controversies as to the interpretation and 
application of this Master Agreement that cannot 
be settled by the representative of the employer 
and the Union, within the period of one week 
from the date that the grievance is called to the 
attention of the other party in writing, shall sub-
mit the matter for decision to a Board of Arbitra-
tion to be constituted as hereinafter set forth": 
Both the Union and defendant selected and agreed 
upon Dean Leary as the Arbitrator. They did not set 
forth in writing as is usually the case, the question to be 
settled by arbitration. However.. the n1atter ,,-as sub-
mitted to the Arbitrator. The decision of the Arbitrator 
concerning the dispute 'vhich ""as submitted to him 
certainly "rould be binding upon both the defendant and 
the Union and if binding upon the Union is binding 
upon plaintiff. 
The Arbitrator, because of the dispute between the 
Union and defendant concerning the question to be ar-
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bitrated resolved that matter in a clearly worded para-
graph under the title "The Issue in Dispute" (R 50). 
There he states that the question in issue was the follow-
ing: 
"Was the discharge of Karna Held on December 
2nd, 1954 by the Company in violation of Article 
III of the contract between the parties". 
Article III forbids discrimination against employees 
and discharge for Union activity. Dean Leary found the 
discharge was not for Union activity, but specifically 
reserved the right of plaintiff to have the question of 
whether or not there was "just cause" for her discharge 
submitted to a court of law where that particular question 
could be decided. 
This conclusion of the Arbitrator reads as follows: 
(R 53) 
"The decision of the present Arbitrator should 
not in any way be construed as foreclosing or pre-
judicing her right to proceed in a court of law 
against the company for a discharge without 'just 
cause' ". 
The Arbitrator not only was interpretating Article III 
of the Master Agreement but also interpreted the agree-
ment in its overall purpose. The opinion and specifically 
that portion of the conclusion of the Arbitrator which is 
quoted shows beyond possible dispute that the arbitrator 
found plaintiff could not be discharged without "just 
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cause." An interpretation and application of the Master 
Agreement gave to her a right of continuing employment 
which could not be terminated except for just cause. 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant can-
not now claim that a new and different interpretation 
should be placed on the Master Agreement. In the case 
of Gionnopulos v. Pappas 80 U. 442 ISP2d 353, this 
court held that both parties were bound by an arbitration 
award and set forth the rule of law which should be 
applied here. It is generally recognized that the award of 
an Arbitrator acting within the scope of his authority 
determines the rights of the parties to it as efficiently as 
a judgment. It is as binding on the parties as a judgment 
until its validity is questioned in some proper manner. 
The law encourages persons ,vho 'vish to settle their 
differences by arbitration as an inexpensive, speedy 
n1ethod of adjudicating differences. A court "~ill not 
review the actions of the arbitrator to correct errors or to 
substitute its conclusion for that of the Arbitrator acting 
honestly and within the scope of his authority. See: Bivons 
v. Utah Lake. Land. Water. and Power Co. 53 Utah 601, 
174 P 1126; Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co. 136 Or. 
622~ 297 P 848; Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific 
Railroad Con1pany 174 Cal 156, 162P 631; 2 R.C.L. 389. 
Both parties having subn1itted the agreement and 
the grievance to the Arbitrator it is respectfully submitted 
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that both parties should be required to give full faith and 
credit to his opinion and should be bound to accept the 
interpretation that he placed upon the Master Agreement. 
He concluded that plaintiff has a continuing right of 
employment which cannot be terminated without "just 
cause." 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed that this court should de-
clare that the Master Agreement between American Linen 
Supply Co. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 
Union 562 grants to the individual workers a right to 
continuing employment which can only be terminated 
for just cause. That the court should then remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings and for a 
trial at which it shall be determined whether or not de-
fendant had any just cause for discharging plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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